Abstract-With sufficient resources, attackers might be able to intrude into multiple substation-level networks of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and send fabricated commands to the local field devices. In this paper, cyberattacks against the SCADA system in the substations of the power system are modeled by a modified semi-Markov process (SMP). The optimal allocation of offensive and defensive resources is modeled as a Colonel Blotto game, and the probabilities of successful cyberattacks on 24 substations are calculated. With the optimal allocated resources, the mean time-to-compromise (MTTCs) of cyberattacks on each substation are calculated, and the loss of load probabilities (LOLP) and expected energy not supplied (EENS) are estimated with the IEEE reliability test system 79 (RTS79). When more offensive or less defensive resources are allocated to the targets, the probabilities of breaker trips resulted by the cyber attacks are increased, less MTTCs are needed on each substation and the power system becomes less reliable.
be launched against control systems without being detected on time, which will bring more serious impacts to the power system. For instance, the advanced persistent threat (APT) takes advantage of the zero-day vulnerabilities and social engineering to gain the access to a target network, and the attacker then covertly resides in the network and plans for attacks [3] . With the successful intrusions into the control system of the power grid, undesirable impact may be caused on the power system, which can be reflected by the reduced asset resource for the compromised target. Since the aim of the attacker is to maximize the loss and the defender of the power system is to minimize the loss, different resource allocation strategies can be created by attackers and defenders. In [4] , a strategic model of the defensive resource allocation is proposed, and it is found that the defender prefers to allocate the resource in a centralized manner when the equilibrium is achieved. A zero-sum game between terrorists and defenders is modeled in [5] . The resources of the attacker and defender are allocated following the minimax theorem, and the probabilities of the optimal attack are calculated. And in [6] , a competitive defender and attack risk model is proposed based on the model of the optimal resource allocation in [5] , it improved the model by considering a dual exponential relationship between the resources of the defender and attacker allocation, and the network risk is minimized.
Vulnerabilities due to the cyber attacks on the SCADA networks in the power system are being evaluated and their impacts are quantified. In [7] , a testbed is built with the simulation of the cyber attack processes in the control center and substations. By assigning various ratios to the cyber and power risk, a risk metric is defined to evaluate the relationship between the occurrence of cyber attacks and the resulting impact on the power service. A vulnerability assessment framework is proposed with the Petri net based firewall and password models as the countermeasure in [8] . In [9] an attack tree model is built, and potential attack scenarios are constituted by combining different attack leaves. The impact of the cyberattacks can be represented by the time of a successful attack on control systems in the power grid. Mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) is used to indicate the average time of a successful attack [10] . MTTCs of the attacks on the SCADA system and computer networks are modeled, and it is found that less MTTC is needed when the skill level of attackers increases. In [11] a strategy of the quantitative risk reduction estimation was performed for the CS60 SCADA control system. The risk is assessed by estimating the mean time needed for a successful cyber attack on the SCADA system, and the risk is reduced by patching the components and decreasing the number of vulnerabilities. In this paper, by using the modified semi-Markov process (SMP) model [12] , MTTCs of various cyber attacks on the substations of the SCADA networks are estimated. And the Colonel Blotto (CB) game is adopted to model optimal values of the transition probabilities of the SMP model. So far, very limited work has been conducted by combining the MTTC evaluation with the optimal resource allocation. Another contribution is the cyber-to-physical bridge between the SCADA network and the power system, and reliability effects on the power grid brought by the cyber attacks are examined and quantified.
In this paper, five cyberattacks are considered to impact on 24 substations. MTTCs of cyberattacks against the targets are estimated with the transition probabilities and mean sojourn times of the SMP model. The CB game is built to solve the optimal resource allocation problem between the attacker and defender. With the probability of the successful attack on the target, the transition probabilities of the SMP model are illustrated by the competition between resources of attackers and defenders. The mean sojourn times of the transient states in the SMP model are inferred based on statistical datasets. With the MTTCs and forensic mean time-to-recovery (MTTRs) of the intruded cyber component in each substation, probabilities of successful cyberattacks on the substations are calculated. When unauthorized commands are injected into the cyber component through the successful attack, system breakers are forced to trip, and outage frequencies of the physical components are increased. With the increased probabilities of successful cyberattacks on substations, the impact on the overall power system reliability is estimated by the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) and represented by values of loss of load probabilities (LOLPs) and expected energy not supplied (EENS).
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ICT CONFIGURATION
AND CYBER SECURITY ISSUES Fig. 1 illustrates the overview of the control center and substation ICT configuration [13] . This architecture utilizes the SCADA system to monitor statuses of the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) in each substation. The SCADA system is also used to transmit the real time measurements and historian data to the control center for analysis and storage. The architecture is composed of five main networks: control center demilitarized zone (DMZ), corporate DMZ, control center local area network (LAN), corporate LAN, and multiple substation LANs.
In order to protect the main networks, components that are able to communicate with the external networks are isolated and the DMZs are generated. By using various servers in DMZs, functions of the cyber components are separated, and the privileges of users are differentiated [13] . For instance, the Inter Control Center Communication Protocol (ICCP) server is isolated into the communication DMZ, which is able to prevent potential attacks between different control centers.
The control center LAN is the primary network where the energy management system (EMS) resides [13] . With the EMS, which is a part of the SCADA system in the control center LAN, substations are continuously monitored and controlled. Various cyber components are installed in the control center LAN, for instance, the application servers are used to process the data transmitted from substations; the historian servers are able to store the historical data; and the human machine interface (HMI) is used to present the information acquired from the front end processors (FEPs) and send commands to substations [14] .
The corporate LAN is composed of business servers, business workstations, and the web application server. Business operations such as communications with the control center, the Intranet services, and some common business functions are performed by the cyber components in the corporate LAN [15] .
Three types of substation LANs are considered based on various stages of substation automation proposed in [16] . Since it is planned that more substations will be integrated with higher levels of automation [16] , it is assumed all substations in the architectures have substation LANs, the substations are installed IEDs and two-way serial and LAN communications, which are controlled by the control center. Three types of substation LANs are assumed with different network configurations and security levels. The first configuration of the substation LAN possesses only IEDs and electromechanical relays, and can be manually or remotely operated through the workstation. The second configuration possesses higher level of automation with a local SCADA installed in the LAN. The local SCADA is a modular system which is able to communicate and control the components in the substation, and it enables more convenient local and remote control. The third configuration separates the control and bay components into two virtual LANs (VLANs), which is able to increase security of the substation network. A shared server and switches are used to control the communication between VLANs, the attackers need to gain the access to the shared server before intruding into the Bay VLAN.
In order to improve cyber security of the ICT components in the power system, different defense-in-depth strategies are applied in the networks of the control center, corporate, and substations in Fig. 1 . Besides using the DMZs to segment the main control networks in the control center and corporate, firewalls, intrusion detection system (IDS), and security policies are considered to prevent cyber attacks on various LANs [13] . Firewalls are installed in each network of the control center, corporate, and substations. They are adopted to provide additional protection to the routers of each network, and add more complicated rules to the communication between various network segments. Firewalls should be selected based on specific requirements of different networks, For instance, the packet filter firewall is suitable for improving the security of the system with unique protocols, and the proxy gateway firewall is suited for segmenting the corporate and control LANs. It is also important to deploy IDS technology at the network and host levels. The network-based IDS can be added to the LANs and DMZs, the attacker who attempts to scan the network would be found with the discovery of the unknown information flow to the target network. The host-based IDS protects specific server or workstation with more robust communication rules and signatures. Effective security policies are also crucial to improving the security of networks and the components contained. Meanwhile, periodic reviews of the policies are necessary to approve the effective system functionality [13] .
Possible main routes that cyber attacks may occur are illustrated in Figs. 2-6. Due to the complicated infrastructure of the defense, it is difficult to successfully attack the control center, but the intrusion into the control center may still occur if critical vulnerabilities of the network are exploited. Fig. 2 represents a simplified route of the intrusion into the control center, and the target is the FEP.
The FEP is able to transmit the commands directly to substations without checking the authority of the command [14] . With the compromised ID and password from the computer of the engineer, the attacker may access to the external VPN. After bypassing the firewall and the network-based IDS, the attacker is able to intrude into the control center LAN. Then the application server is selected as the intermediate server to the target FEP. The application server is used to store the point data and send the updated data to the connected components, such as the HMI and data historian, thus a host-based IDS is installed at the application server to prevent the unauthorized information flow. So it is necessary for the attacker to compromise the application server without triggering the alarm of the IDS, then the attacker will gain access to the FEP and leave the trip commands.
The attacker may also access the control center LAN by using the corporate LAN as the intermediate network. In Fig. 3 , the attacker intrudes into the corporate LAN through the corporate modem by scanning all available ports. He bypasses the corporate firewall with the IDS, and intrudes into the corporate LAN. After the successful intrusion, the attacker will compromise the web application server, which is able to process the data from the outside components. The business workstation connected to the web application server may be compromised, and the inside data of the control center will be acquired by the attacker. Information such as password of servers in the control center and substations may be found from the inside data, and it will be more difficult for the firewalls and IDSs to distinguish the data flows from the corporate LAN to the control center and substations.
Three types of substation LANs with different automation stages and network architectures are considered, and different routes of intrusion on these substations are illustrated in Figs. 4-6. Fig. 4 illustrates the intrusion route to the targeted workstation in substation LAN 1. The attacker is able to access the substation LAN through the external VPN. It is assumed that only one firewall is used as the countermeasure of substation LAN 1, malicious packets disguised as regular packets may flow into the network without being detected, thus the attacker is able to obtain the root privilege of the targeted workstation when the substation LAN is successfully intruded. Trip commands will be sent to the IEDs in substation 1 from the workstation. Fig. 5 shows the attack route into the substation LAN 2. With the local SCADA, the substation LAN 2 is a network with higher level of the automation. The local SCADA is the only component which is able to communicate with other networks, and other components are prevented from directly connecting to the outside network, thus it is more difficult for the attacker to obtain the priority of the targeted workstation. Besides the firewall of the network, host-based IDSs are installed in the local SCADA and workstation, more efficient defense can thus be provided. In order to send trip commands from the workstation to the LAN, the attackers need to breach the local SCADA, as well as avoid the detection of the IDSs on the local SCADA and the workstation.
The route of the attack on the workstation in the substation LAN 3 is illustrated in Fig. 6 . The architecture of the substation LAN 3 is more complicated by separating the substation network into two VLANs based networks, which are station VLAN and bay VLAN. Switches are used to separate the VLAN networks, the attacker needs to first intrude into the shared server, which is installed with an IDS. After the privilege of the shared server is obtained, the attacker needs to scan the switch which is connected to the station VLAN. As the second host-based IDS should be bypassed on the workstation, it is also difficult to successfully reach the target.
III. PRELIMINARIES OF THE COLONEL BLOTTO GAME
The Colonel Blotto (CB) game is a constant-sum game by modeling the competition between two players, and , who possess a certain amount of resources and fight over a finite number of battlefields. CB is a fundamental model of the strategic resource allocation, players ( and ) decide how resources are deployed on each battlefield and maximize their payoff [17] .
The model of the CB is labeled as . It is a one-shot game, which indicates both players distribute their force resources on targets simultaneously subject to their budget constraints. Each target is won by the player who allocates larger amount of resources on the battlefield, and the payoff of the player is the proportion of the resources on the successful battles [18] .
The players and allocate their resources and across battlefields. Each battlefield possesses a payoff of , and the payoff of each player is the sum of the payoffs across all battlefields. Let , when the players allocated the same proportion of resources to a battlefield, it is considered that the player wins the battlefield. This specification of the tie-breaking rule does not affect results of the resource allocation if . When , it is not necessary for the player to allocate the level of resources arbitrarily close to the maximal allocation of the resource . Also, resources allocated to each battlefield should be nonnegative [18] . For one player , the set of allocations of resources across battlefields is presented as: (1) When is satisfied, no pure strategy equilibrium could be found [18] . A mixed strategy of the resource allocation can be found. With , which is the set of resource allocations from the player , and with the one-dimensional marginal distribution functions , which is the one univariate marginal distribution function for each battlefield , the player is the -variate distribution function . The allocation of resources on battlefields from or is a random -tuple drawn from the -variate distribution function , which has a set of univariate marginal distribution functions [18] . The CB game is a fundamental model of the strategic resource allocation in the single dimension or multiple dimensions. The CB game is widely used to model the economical competitions, such as political campaigns and lobbying. Another popular application of the CB game is the competition of the redistribution with the fixed budget [18] . Compared with other game theory approaches, the CB game is particularly suitable for the competition between players who are considered as the attacker and defender [19] , and it is specifically suitable allocations of the asymmetric resources between competitors [18] . CB is also suitable for modeling the competition mechanism in cyber attacks. A phishing problem which presents the asymmetric conflict between attackers and defenders is modeled in [19] by using the two-stage CB game.
IV. SMP MODELS FOR SECURITY QUANTIFICATION
OF THE SCADA SYSTEM
A. SMP Model of the Cyber Attack on the SCADA System
A large number of cyberattacks have been reported to affect the SCADA systems in the power gird. The reliability of the power system can be impacted by the command injection attacks. Generally, the command injection attacks send false commands of the control and configuration to the control system. The attackers may attempt to inject the false supervisory control commands to the SCADA network of the power system. The remote terminal units (RTUs) and the IEDs are able to automatically monitor and control the physical components at a remote site. Since most commands are transmitted in an unencrypted format, and they are programmed in the regular languages such as C code, then attackers are able to overwrite original configurations. In current SCADA networks, communication protocols are lack of authentication features to validate the source of the packets, so this may also result in the replacement of the command packets. Command injection attacks may lead to the interruption of the process control to the RTUs and IEDs, the interruption of the communications between components in the SCADA network, and the unauthorized modification of the configurations in the components [20] .
In order to quantify the process of cyberattacks on the power system, an SMP model is used to demonstrate the detailed behaviors of the attacker. The general SMP model of the intrusion process is illustrated in Fig. 7 . The SMP model is composed of various states. The first process is related to the good state , which represents the good or secure situation of the SCADA system. The second process is the intrusion process into the SCADA system which contains states, and each state represents one phase of the attack activity. By proceeding on each action sequentially, a higher privilege level of the SCADA system can be obtained by the attacker, and the control command will be sent to intelligent devices of the substation for tripping the breakers. The last process is associated with the failure state , which indicates the failed status of the SCADA system in the substation. In the SMP model of the attack process, state and intrusion states are considered to be transient states, and the state is classified as the absorbing state. The classification of the SMP states into transient and absorbing states depends on the nature of the intrusion [21] .
B. SMP Models of the Command Injection Attacks
Various approaches can be used to realize the command injection attack on the cyber component in the SCADA system. In this paper, five cyberattack techniques and their SMP models are considered to intrude into 24 substations of the power system. The SMP models of these attacks are described as follows.
1) Model of the SQL Injection Attack:
Since attackers are not administrators of the databases (DBAs), they use different routes to access the databases. For an attacker, the database can be used to penetrate into the rest of the network more efficiently. Intrusions via the SQL injection are aimed at obtaining higher privileges of the system, such as reading or writing files, executing the commands, altering the username and passwords, among many others. SQL injection may modify the database contents and therefore directly alter or even disable the control of substations. Attackers may send the trip command to one substation through the SQL injection attack and trip corresponding breakers. The process relating to the SQL injection can be divided into four phases, and the SMP model of the SQL injection attack is illustrated in Fig. 8 [22] .
The process is detailed as follows.
(1) Discovering the SQL injection vulnerabilities. When SQL injection tests are applied to a vulnerable web page, a generic database error message will be created. This indicates the user input validation is not properly performed. If the web application administrator has turned on a custom error page instead of allowing the standard open database connectivity (ODBC) error messages, legitimate injected queries may be submitted and no error will be returned. Thus injected queries will reach the database and be executed. (2) Reversing the vulnerable SQL query. In this phase, error messages are produced with invalid SQL queries, and the responds to queries in the database are analyzed. (3) Obtaining the results of arbitrary SQL queries and enumerate the privileges. The attackers are able to access to the database in this stage and find out useful information, such as the passwords or procedures, and the attacker is able to control the database. (4) Penetrating into the infrastructure. A Trojan can be imbedded to the remote machine, the attacker is able to penetrate the network which possesses the SQL server [22] .
2) Model of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Man-in-theMiddle (MITM) Attack:
A MITM attack represents the traffic which is intercepted between two hosts, and the data are monitored or modified during the transition without being detected by the victims. For instance, information contained in the application service data unit (ASDU) can be intercepted and modified. The trip commands may be transmitted from the fault location to the server in the substation from the user interface, thus breakers of the generators or the transmission lines in the substations can be tripped by the attackers.
One specific MITM attack is the SSL MITM attack. SSL can be prone to the MITM attacks if users and client applications do not appropriately validate the server certificate identities. The MITM attack can impact the system via a proxy which intercepts client-to-server communications. The actions of the SSL MITM attack can be divided into three phases which are illustrated in Fig. 9 . (1) The hacking proxy intercepts the keys exchanged during the SSL handshakes between the legitimate client and the server. (2) The hacking proxy substitutes a set of rogue keys, and the attacker spoofs identities of the client and the server in the ongoing SSL session. (3) The attacker substitutes its public or private key in the key exchanges, and the attacking tool is able to read and control any data between the client and the server [22] .
3) Model of the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing Attack:
The ARP spoofing attack is able to modify the information of the cached Medium Access Control (MAC) and IP address. The MAC address uniquely identifies each interface connected to the network. Since each Ethernet card owns a unique address, the component with the Ethernet card is able to interconnect in the network and has no conflicts among the addresses, and the ARP is used to look for additional interfaced devices in the LAN. The attacker may launch the ARP spoofing attack on the SCADA system. When an application in the SCADA sends a request to the system controller, the request is redirected to the attacker instead of the task component. The attacker does not completely transmit the request to the system controller; rather, he interrupts the communication between controller and other applications. This may result in the failure in controlling and monitoring the substations. Then false control commands to substations may be generated by the attacker. Trip commands will be sent from the attacker with the forged legitimate address. The state transition diagram of the spoofing attack is shown in Fig. 10 . The procedure of the spoofing attack is divided into four phases: (1) Conducting the reconnaissance to identify the trust relations; (2) Taking out the trusted host from the network; (3) Sampling the sequence numbers of the target system; (4) Forging the packet which contains the spoofed source address. The backdoor on the target host can also be set up if the exploit is successful [22] .
4) Model of the Buffer Overflow Attack:
In executing the buffer overflow attacks, the attacker would access the substation network through some exploited entry points. One practical buffer overflow is the heap overflow, which enables the attacker to compromise the destination component. By exploiting some zero-day vulnerabilities, the implementation details of the memory are allocated on each platform, and the attacker is allowed to write a small amount of data into a place they choose. The target of the buffer overflow attack is the data aggregator in the substation. In order to inject the command from the substation, a connection between the attacker and the aggregator should be established. Since the authentication is not supported in the current DNP3 protocol to prevent the attacker from compromising the relays, there is no difficulty for the attacker to intrude into the data aggregator. The buffer overflow attack can then be launched from the compromised relays to the targeted data aggregator. By exploiting the vulnerability of the event buffers in the DNP3 slave devices installed in the substations, the privilege of the attacker is escalated. By compromising the data aggregator, the attacker is able to inject the false trip command to the breakers.
The sequence of the standard heap overflow is the same intrusion process of MITM attacks shown in Fig. 9 . It is divided into three phases: (1) The heap is initialized when the program starts, and a heap structure is overflown during the login procedure. ( 2) The program allocates another block on the heap. "True" is written into the location of the program that the attacker is authorized to access. (3) Log on the component so that the component can be controlled [22] .
5) Model of the Session Hijacking Attack:
Most SCADA systems communicate through the network and rely on the unencrypted communications. The attackers may thus make the most of the session hijacking attack. As new substations may utilize low-power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPANs) in the future SCADA system, a specific layer in the protocol stack may be found as a target of the new threat [20] . When some stateless protocols such as the HTTP are used in the substation, the state information across the sessions is not maintained by the application servers. Thus the state information may be lost when one session is terminated. In order to track the activities of the users, servers typically employ state-based controls such as cookies, URL fields, and hidden tags to facilitate session monitoring. A session ID is used to provide some authorization mechanisms for classifying or identifying the users. When an attacker has successfully captured a session ID with the packet sniffer tool, credentials attached to that session ID may be used to gain the unauthorized access to a website of the server, and the malicious command can be sent from the server in the substation. The process of session hijacking is divided into two phases and is illustrated in Fig. 11: (1) Capturing the session and the credential which are generated from the HTTP server and (2) Initiating a new session and gaining the access to the server, so that the command could be sent from the server by the attacker [22] . represents the transition matrix of the SSL MITM attack: (3) is defined to be the transition matrix of the ARP spoofing attack on the substation, which is the same as . is defined to be the transition matrix of the buffer overflow attack on the substation, which is the same as . represents the transition matrix of session hijacking attack on the substation:
The MTTC of the successful cyberattacks is: (5) where is the average number of times that state is visited before the absorbing states are reached, and is the mean sojourn time in state [21] . The visit count element is:
where is the probability that the discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) starts at state [21] . It is assumed that the initial state is always state G, thus is 1 and other are 0. is the element in matrix .
By substituting elements in the matrix , visit count elements of the SQL injection attack on the substation are:
of the SSL MITM attack depicted with elements in are:
in is represented as follows:
in is the same as the elements in . in is represented as follows:
B. Optimal Resource Allocation and Transition Probability
The optimal resources allocation on targets is formulated as a CB game, which is a zero-sum game involving two players for distributing resources to battlefields [23] . As the attackers and defenders possess some specific amount of offensive and defensive resources, attackers will consider how they can attack most critical substations, while defenders consider how they may protect most substations. And the CB game provides the approach with the optimal allocation of the attack and defense resources.
Assume there are targets indexed by , and each target has its asset value subject to . Since there are 24 substations, is 24. The attacker has the total offensive resource and will launch an attack on a random targeted substation, and the defender owns total resource for defense on each target. and indicate the resources allocated to target from the attackers and the defenders, respectively. The asset value of the substation indicates the measurement and status data in the database servers. The substations possess different degrees of the automation and the network configurations, thus the amount and the importance of the data are various. The approaches and the skill levels of an attacker are considered as the offensive resources . With more advanced intrusion tools and inside information, more vulnerabilities of the substation networks can be exploited, this indicates more attack resources are possessed by the attackers. The defensive resources are represented by the degrees of the defense mechanisms. In the substations, various security strategies are used, such as the firewalls, IDS, and security policies. More advanced countermeasures, such as the hardware firewall and larger number of IDSs will be used in the crucial substations.
All the offensive resource , defensive resource , as well as asset values are represented by monetary values. This is because all offensive and defensive techniques can be evaluated by monetary values. For instance, IDSs and firewalls are used as protective measures in the control center and substations. More expensive and complicated IDSs and firewalls are able to detect and filter a larger amount of unauthorized and malicious data. This indicates that a higher degree of defensive mechanism is embedded in the SCADA system. On the other hand, a larger amount of monetary investment is needed for attaining more advanced techniques by professional intruders for launching more efficient attacks against the targets. The costs of intrusion techniques thus indicate the skill levels of attackers. Meanwhile, data in the cyber networks of the control center or substations can be evaluated in terms of their monetary values. These data can be considered as part of the system assets, so the loss or malicious modification of these data can be quantified by the loss of their corresponding monetary value.
The physical significance of the resource units in the five techniques discussed in Section IV can be indicated by the monetary values. Investment is needed to launch the cyber attacks, and offensive techniques of various levels are necessary to keep the intrusion process going on till the targeted component is reached. Intrusion techniques can be evaluated in terms of their monetary values. The amount of resource units indicates the monetary expense for accomplishing the successful intrusion, and the base number of the resource unit can be assumed as one thousand or one million.
It is assumed that for each target , it satisfies . This is a realistic assumption because the target of the attacker may be one specific institution, but defenders should provide protection to all targets since it is not necessary for attackers to announce which institution will be attacked. When the attackers and defenders have allocated and to the targets, the probability of the successful attack on each target can be calculated.
The vector showing the resource of the attacker is selected to maximize the expected loss of the target (denoted by ), and all satisfy . The vector of the defenders is to minimize subjected to . With the originally distributed asset resources and optimally allocated and on each target, probability of a successful attack on the target is modeled as: (7) where It is assumed that is a random value in [0, 1], which shows the base probability that at least one attack attempt has occurred on one target.
is the probability that one substation or the control center is selected as the target when the attempt is successful. It is concluded that for targets, . is the probability that the attack on the target is undetected. Assume the searchable resource of the target is units , the attacker allocates units to compromise the target, and the defenders possess on target for detecting the possible intrusions.
It is assumed that the searchable amount of target resources consists of independent units, the attacker possesses units of offensive resources, which are randomly distributed across the targets, and the defender possesses units, each of the defender unit is used to resist one attacker unit. The probability that the first unit deployed by the defender to fight against the attacker is . Once the first unit fails, the probability that the second unit will succeed is . If neither of the first two units was successful, the probability that the third unit will succeed is and so forth [23] . Therefore, the probability that all units will fail to resist or defeat the attack is represented as: (8) It is assumed that the value of the target is much larger than the values of the resources possessed by the attacker and the defender, which indicates , and . Thus (8) can be simplified, and the probability that the attacks are undetected can be estimated as follows: (9) is the probability that the attack action is successful without being detected. Assume the attacker initially possesses units and the defender owns units [10] , the probability of the successful attack (without being detected) is represented as follows: (10) Thus the probability of the successful attack on target is: (11) where , and it satisfies , subject to . As the attacker successfully intrudes into the targeted substation, important inside data and information may be obtained in an unauthorized way. This can be considered as the loss of the targets and the defenders. Based on the value of assets and defensive resources on each substation, a certain amount of losses can be caused by the attacker if he successfully controls the targeted substation, and the total loss of the defender is the sum of the loss on each targeted substation. The post-attack effective loss of the target is defined as: (12) where is the loss function, which is an increasing and concave downward function; and is the Bernoulli random variable. If is the independent and identically distributed random variable, for small value of probability , the expected value of the loss of the target is: (13) As is the Bernoulli random variable, the value of is either 1 or 0. In this paper, it is assumed that only one substation is attacked in each cyber attack. This assumption is reasonable, because usually it is very difficult and highly costly to launch cyber attacks on multiple substations simultaneously. Also, severe impact will be brought to the power system even if one substation is attacked successfully. Also, in order to illustrate the impact brought about by the cyber attack more apparently, the scenario that several substations are attacked simultaneously is not considered. As one substation is selected as the target of the random attack, only one is 1 and others are 0, which implies is satisfied and the approximation in (13) will become exact [23] .
The optimal resource allocation model is explained as follows:
Theorem: Define , where , and , where is a positive constant. If the following conditions are satisfied: 1) , 2) , 3) , Then vectors and will form a strategic equilibrium, which provides a scheme of optimal resource allocation to each target. The proof is provided in [23] .
When and are optimally allocated, , and which constitute can be calculated. They are considered as the transition probabilities in the SMP model. In the models of the SQL injection attack and the spoofing attack, is the probability that the network become vulnerable, thus it is represented by , which implies that the attack on target is attempted and becomes vulnerable. and are represented by , because intrusion processes such as gaining access to the network and obtaining the privilege are not direct attacks, and they still need to avoid from being detected. Meanwhile, in the model of the SQL injection attack and in both models describe the probability of the successful cyberattack on the target component, which is represented by .
Similarly, in the models of the SSL MITM attack and the heap overflow, is denoted by and are represented by , and is calculated with . In the model of the session ID hijacking, is illustrated by is represented by , and is denoted by .
C. Mean Sojourn Time Estimation
The mean sojourn time indicates the average time consumed by the attacker on state . In the MTTC estimation, only sojourn times of the transient states are needed. They are specified as positive constants based on the empirical study. is the mean time that the system is in state , which implies that no cyberattacks could occur on the network. From [24] the attackers may launch various cyberattacks each day, thus is set as 1 day for all five attacks. Since the first stage of all attacks can be considered as the initialization of the attack, indicates the mean time that the system is vulnerable, which is considered as the average time between the announcement of a vulnerability and its exploit. Thus is set as the mean time to release the exploit, which is 5.8 days [25] . In the SQL injection attack, indicates the mean time to generate the error message, which will not last long, thus it is assumed as 0.5 days. is the mean time to obtain the privilege of the targeted component, Since the attackers are able to exploit the vulnerabilities in state 3, they may elevate the privilege of the component directly, and is assumed as 1 day [10] . of the SQL injection attacks represents the mean penetration time, which is the mean time to launch the attack before being detected, and it is substituted by the average time between the announcement of an attack and the release of the patches. Based on the data in [24] , is about 1.8 days. Similarly, in the SSL MITM attack, is assumed as 1 day since state 2 is a process to elevate the privilege of the attacker. In state 3, the attacker is able to read and control data between the client and server, thus of the MITM attack is set as 1.8 days. In the ARP spoofing attack, since the privilege of the attacker can be elevated in both state 2 and state 3, and are assumed as 1 day respectively since the average time to exploit vulnerabilities is 1 day when both exploits and vulnerabilities are available [10] . is assumed as 1.8 days since in state 4 the packet with the spoofed source address is forged, and the spoofing attack is launched in this state. In the buffer overflow attack, since the zero-day vulnerability is assumed to be exploited, is assumed as 2 days. is set as 4 days [26] , which is the mean time of the attack announcement and the release of the zero-day vulnerability patches. In the session hijacking attack, the target server can be accessed when the new session is generated, thus the average attack time is assumed as 1.8 days.
D. Reliability Evaluation
In the attack, it is assumed that the attacker has successfully intruded into the server of the targeted substation, and the server is considered to control the whole substation. When the substation is attacked, the attackers will control the server and send trip commands to IEDs installed, which will result in the unauthorized trips of the generators, transmission lines, and the loads of the substation. In the cyberattack, one substation is selected as the target, and it is assumed that all breakers in the targeted substation are tripped if the attack is successful. This assumption is reasonable because the acquisition units (DAUs) are randomly controlled by the IEDs in the substation [27] . The DAUs collect data of the voltage transformers, current transformers, and status information for substations, and these transformers are controlled by different breakers. One IED is able to acquire data from several DAUs, and one DAU is able to receive protection commands from several IEDs, the commands are used to control the protection devices to open and close. Since there is no fixed mapping between the DAUs and the IEDs, the attackers may generate the commands to trip all breakers of the substation, so that the most severe impact can be caused to the power system.
The trip commands will be sent to fail all breakers when the substation is intruded successfully. This will lead the system to the failure state , and result in the corresponding physical components being in the repair state. The repair time after a successful cyberattack is composed of the cyber forensics time and the physical restoration duration. And the mean time-torepair is denoted by MTTR. In this paper, the forensic MTTR is assumed as 4 hour in all attack scenarios. The probability of the successful cyberattack is represented as: (14) The reliability evaluation procedure aims to assess the capacity of the power system to supply electric power to the customers with the desired service quality. The power system reliability evaluation method based on Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) has been established considering the random physical failure of the physical current-carrying devices [28] . The basic steps are shown in Fig. 12 .
One key step in Fig. 12 is to evaluate the sampled system state. Usually this is conducted based on optimal power flow (OPF) analysis, which assumes that the operators can make the power dispatch decisions based on OPF to minimize the load curtailment when the outages happen.
The conventional reliability assessment of power grid does not take cyberattacks against substations into consideration. In this study, by extending the conventional reliability evaluation framework shown in Fig. 13 , the power grid reliability is evaluated based on the MCS considering both cyberattacks and the physical failures. The evaluation process is illustrated in Fig. 13 , and the major steps are described as follows: 1) The reliability of each physical component is modeled.
The physical components are composed of the generators, transmission lines, and loads. Reliabilities of the transmission lines are modeled by the outage rate and outage duration hours, and reliabilities of the generators are modeled by MTTRs and MTTCs.
2) The MTTCs of various attacks are modeled considering the allocations of attack and defense, as described in Section V. Because very limited data are available, without loss of generality, the MTTR after a successful cyberattack is assumed as four hours in this study. 3) A physical system state is randomly chosen based on the Monte Carlo simulation. 4) For each selected substation and attack type, the probability of the successful cyberattack is checked. A random number within [0, 1] is generated, and it is compared with of the selected attack scenario. If is less than the random number, it indicates the cyberattack is unsuccessful, and the status of the components will remain unchanged; otherwise, update the status of the components as in step 5. 5) The statuses of the physical components affected by cyberattacks are updated. If a substation control system is successfully compromised, the physical components directly connected to the attacked substation will be tripped. For instance, the status of a generator will become down from up when it is successfully tripped.
Step 4 and 5 need to be repeated until all the substations and all the attack types are considered. 6) Each system state is evaluated based on OPF analysis.
indicates the energy not supplied, and indicates whether it is a loss-of-load state.
-- 
7)
If the stopping criterion is not satisfied, go to step 3. The duration of the simulation is specified as 30 years and each simulation step is 1 hour in this paper, and it is sufficient for achieving the MCS convergence. 8) The reliability indices are calculated. The common reliability indices, which are the LOLP and EENS, are calculated in this study as follows:
where NS denotes the total number of samples.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A. Power System Topology
The simulation is carried out based on IEEE RTS79 system. Its topology is shown in Fig. 14 . It has 24 substations, 32 generating units, and the peak load demand is 2850 MW. The detailed parameters can be found in [29] . Fig. 15 illustrates the allocation of the asset resource on 24 substations. The amount of the total asset resources of targets is assumed as units. Since the levels of the automation are different among the substations, substations with higher automation levels are able to process and transmit larger amount of data, which indicates they are allocated larger amount of resources. Meanwhile, substations with higher automation levels are more critical and are more likely to be selected as targets by the attacker. The risk levels and resources of the substations are selected according to the automation levels of the substations. In this paper, the automation levels of the substations are randomly assumed, which entails that the resources are randomly assigned to the 24 substations. In Fig. 15 , the numbers 1 through 24 indicate the 24 substations. It is found that the substation 17 owns the largest amount of resources, which is about units, while substation 5 possesses the least amount of resources, which is about units. The value of the resource indicates the importance of the target, substations with the larger amount of asset resources are considered to possess larger monetary values due to more critical data and components. Fig. 16 shows the optimal allocation of offensive resource on 24 substations and Fig. 17 illustrates defensive resource with the increasing amount of . The constraints are fixed as , and . is set the value . Since it is required that of a target is larger than the amount of , which means the largest total amount of is less than the least amount of . In Fig. 16 , the total offensive resources are given values of , and units respectively (shown as to ). Fig. 17 illustrates the optimal allocation of the defensive resource . It is found that allocations of both offensive and defensive resources are proportional to the allocation of on each target, and both largest amounts of and are given to the substation 17. Figs. 18 and 19 illustrate the probabilities of successful attacks on each substation with various and , respectively. In all simulations, is assumed as 0.5. It can be observed that the distribution of is also proportional to that of the asset resource on each target. With a larger amount of or a smaller amount of , the target among the substations has a larger probability of being attacked. As increases or decreases, the probabilities that all targets are attacked will be increased. Substation 17 features the highest probability of being attacked, since it has been assigned with the largest amount of offensive resources or its attacker possesses the least amount of defensive resources. Since the smallest values are specified for the substation 5 (i.e., , and ), it has the least probability of being attacked. Fig. 20 illustrates losses of the targets caused by the attack, and is assumed to be 10. The left-hand plot in Fig. 20 shows the loss of all targets when the attack resource increases from to . It indicates that the total loss of the targets increases as increases. This is because the attacker at a higher level is able to take more resources of the targets and bring more severe impact to the network. The right-hand plot in Fig. 20 illustrates the loss of all targets when the defensive resource increases from to . As the level of the defender increases, it is more difficult for the attacker to intrude into the targets, thus the loss of the targets decreases accordingly.
B. Optimal Resource Allocation and Probability of the Successful Attack
C. MTTCs of Cyber Attacks on Substations
Figs. 21 through 24 represent the MTTCs of SQL injection attack and the buffer overflow attack on each substation with different amounts of and . It is shown that as the amount of the total attack resource increases from to , less MTTC is needed by all targets. This is because the level of attacker is improved when he possesses more attack resources. For instance, if more advanced intrusion tools are available to the attacker, the attacker is able to exploit more vulnerabilities with less time. Also, it is found that MTTC needed by the attacker on all targets is larger when the amount of defensive resources increases from to . This is because the network is more robust when the level of defensive strength is higher, and more effort from the attacker is needed to penetrate through the defensive protection and gain access to a higher privilege of the target. For all substations, it can be observed that a smaller MTTC value is needed when the attacker uses a larger amount of attack resources on one substation. Meanwhile, a larger MTTC is needed to intrude into the substation as it is assigned with more defensive resources . Thus it can be found that the least MTTCs are needed on substation 17 as compared with other MTTCs of substations. Also, intrusions on substation 5 cost the largest MTTCs.
From the values of MTTCs for the five attacks, it is found that with the same amount of offensive or defensive resources, the least MTTCs are needed by the SQL injection attack on all substations, which are almost twice less than those of other attacks. This is because state can be led from both state 3 and state 4 in the SMP model, which increases the probability of success for attacking on the targets. Also, although the same number of states is needed by the SSL MITM attack and the buffer overflow attack, larger values of the MTTCs are needed by the buffer overflow attack. Since a larger mean time interval is needed to exploit the zero-day vulnerability, larger mean sojourn time in the SMP model of the buffer overflow attack will be resulted in.
D. LOLP and EENS Curves for IEEE RTS79
The impacts of the cyber attacks on the power system reliability are demonstrated by LOLP and EENS. Curves of the LOLP and EENS with the increasing offensive resources and defensive resources are illustrated in Figs. 25 through 28. It is found that both LOLP and EENS values increase as the offensive resource increases, and these values decrease as the defensive resource increases.
In Fig. 25 , when is between and units, and is between and units, the LOLP values increase from the least value 0.0988 to the largest value 0.3854, and the EENS values vary from to in Fig. 26 . And when is between and units, and when is between and , the LOLP values decrease from about 0.3982 to 0.109 in Fig. 27 , and the EENS values range between and in Fig. 28 . It is also illustrated that the both distributions of LOLP and EENS curves are converging as larger amount of defensive resources is provided. This is because as the defensive resource increases, it is more difficult for the attacker to successfully intrude into the substation with the fixed amount of offensive resources, and the probability of the successful attack decreases to least value potential attack/defense consequences on a set of substations using the SMP models of the intrusion process. The resources of the attackers and the defenders are optimally allocated to 24 targets, and the probabilities of successful cyberattacks on each target are calculated. The transition probabilities of the SMP model in the intrusion tolerant system are represented by probabilities derived from the probability of the successful attack. The mean sojourn times of the transient states are assumed based on the statistical data. The results illustrate that the target with more attack and defensive resources has a higher probability of being attacked. Also, MTTC of the target increases as fewer offensive resources are allocated to attackers or more defensive resources are allocated to the target. By using the MCS on IEEE RTS79, values of the LOLP and EENS are estimated to quantify the impact of the breaker trips on power system reliability. It is found that with a larger amount of offensive resource or less amount of defensive resource, the probability of the successful cyberattack will be increased, and the power system will become less reliable.
In the future research, various attack patterns and the resultant impacts on the physical power system will be investigated. Different game-theoretic frameworks will be developed with considerations of more complicated intrusion and defensive strategies. Attack scenarios in a practical environment will be evaluated and validated to obtain realistic values of successful attack probabilities.
